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Current Challenges in Scottish Family Law 




In 1988 the UK Parliament, with conscious malignity and etymological illiteracy, 
prohibited ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV IURP SURPRWLQJ ³KRPRVH[XDOLW\ DV D SUHWHQGHG IDPLO\
UHODWLRQVKLS´1 (subsequently providing the model for more recent legislation to the 
VDPHHIIHFWLQ0U3XWLQ¶V5XVVLD One of the first things the Scottish Parliament did 
after its (re)establishment was to repeal the so-FDOOHG³VHFWLRQ´.2  To their shame, 
Scottish Conservative MSPs voted unanimously to retain the prohibition, while not a 
single other MSP did so.3  Fourteen years later the Scottish Parliament passed the 
Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, a far starker rejection of the 
distaste for same-sex families embodied in section 28.  Within the overall majority of 
105 to 18, Scottish Conservative MSPs voted 8 against and 6 in favour of the 2014 
Act, revealing a party still predominantly resistant to an expanded conception of the 
family, though less overwhelmingly so than in 2000.4  The change in voting patterns 
between 2000 and 2014 reflects but is not wholly explained by the general 
weakening of social conservatism in Scottish society.  There has in addition been a 
shift in the understanding of what family law is actually for. 
Family law traditionally ZDV WKH VWDWH¶V PHDQV RI encouraging particular forms of 
family relationship (most obviously, through the legal preferences and protections 
afforded by the institution of marriage) and of discouraging other forms (by refusing 
legal recognition to unmarried couples, E\GLVDGYDQWDJLQJWKH³LOOHJLWLPDWH´child, and 
by dismissing same-sex relationships as ³SUHWHQGHG´).  Today, however, legislatures 
across the (western) world have lost their appetite for using family law in this 
directory fashion, and instead have adopted a more regulatory approach which 
                                                          
1 Local Government Act 1988, s.28. 
2 Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000, s.34. 
3 Though two SNP MSPs (Dr and Mr Ewing) abstained. 
4 In England in the second reading debate on the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill 2013 Conservative MPs 
voted 136 against and 127 voted in favour. 
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seeks to give space to individuals to construct their family lives in a way that they 
choose as most suitable for them: a model, in other words, of social liberalism in the 
tradition of John Stuart Mills.  But this new approach creates new challenges, which 
can be seen in both the main aspects of family law: regulation of adult domestic 
relationships, and of the parent-child relationship. 
 
Adult Relationships 
By the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, the Scottish Parliament achieved for 
Scotland what no other part of the United Kingdom has yet been able to achieve: 
substantial formal recognition of cohabiting couples, carrying practical (financial) 
consequences for the individuals concerned.  Previously, the mutuality of rights and 
obligations inherent in marriage were limited to marital couples, and unmarried 
couples were left to utilise, as best they could, such legal mechanisms as contract, 
will, and unjustified enrichment to protect the interests that family law protected 
through marriage.  But the increasing number of cohabitants clearly showed that the 
assumption underpinning this, that couples could be encouraged to marry by 
withholding marital benefits from those who did not, was flawed, and the major effect 
of the non-recognition of cohabitation was to make more vulnerable the economically 
weaker of the two (typically women) ± as well as, paradoxically, giving an incentive 
to the economically dominant (typically men) to avoid marriage with its range of 
financial consequences. 
But the 2006 Act does not make the financial claims of the cohabitant equivalent to 
those of the spouse (as similar legislation in, for example, Australia and New 
Zealand does).  Instead, there are provisions to ensure that what a court awards on 
death or separation will be less than what might be sought at the end of a 
marriage/civil partnership.  The Act is designed to respond to the reality that 
domestic relationships can create financial imbalances irrespective of how they are 
legally structured, but at the same time to retain an institutional preference for 
marriage/civil partnership.  The main flaw in this approach is that the 2006 legislation 
gives no clear picture of what it is trying to achieve for cohabitants.  Courts are given 
little guidance on how to value the claims, and in the absence of any clear indication 
of the very purpose of the claims courts have struggled to exercise the discretion the 
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Act gives them with any consistency.  It took the Supreme Court to tell us that, 
looking at the background papers that accompanied the Family Law (Scotland) Bill in 
2005, together with the debates at Holyrood on that Bill, the underlying principle (at 
least in a claim on separation) is one of ³fairness´.  This is useful, so far as it goes, 
but fairness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder and the end result is that 
determination of the aim of the law has passed from the legislature to the judiciary.  
7KLVPLJKWSHUKDSVEHDQLQHYLWDEOHFRQVHTXHQFHRIIDPLO\ODZ¶VFKDQJH in overall 
purpose from directory to regulatory, but it does mean that parties have nothing to 
lose by raising speculative actions.  Such encouragement is never good legal policy. 
The policy objectives behind the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 
were far clearer but its passing signifies, even more than the 2006 Act, the Scottish 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V DFFHSWDQFH WKDW IDPLO\ ODZ¶V UROH LV QR longer to encourage certain 
forms of family over others but rather to reflect and regulate family life as it is in fact 
led.  It is as well to remind ourselves how recently the law in Scotland acted to 
diminish and destroy same-sex families for religious/ideological reasons.  As noticed 
above, ³VHFWLRQ´ with its dismissive message of contempt, remained in force until 
2000, as did differential ages of lawful sexual activity; the Scottish courts were, as 
late as 1995, removing children from their mothers who entered lesbian 
relationships; anti-discrimination legislation did not cover discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation until 2003, before which it was lawful to refuse to 
employ or promote, or to pay less, gay and lesbian people; it remained lawful to 
refuse to provide goods and services to gay and lesbian people until 2007; joint 
adoption by same-sex couples was not permitted until 2009; and it took Strasbourg 
until 2011 to accept that same-sex couples had a right to respect for their family life 
under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 is the culmination of these 
statutory developments if, paradoxically, one of the least significant in terms of strict 
legal effect (given the substantive effects of the original Civil Partnership Act 2004).  
Underpinning the Parliamentary debates on the Bill were very different conceptions 
not only of the meaning of marriage, but also and more profoundly of the very role of 
the law in regulating family life.  Was marriage an institution of such venerable age, 
or of such divine creation, that it was simply not in the realm of the law to change its 
essential nature?  Is the role of the law to create an environment in which all families 
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have the greatest opportunity to thrive, irrespective of how they are structured, or to 
JLYHHIIHFW WR WKHVWDWH¶VGHFLVLRQVDV WR which forms are most likely to lead to the 
greatest good of society itself?  And if the latter, what forms of evidence might law- 
and policy-makers legitimately use to determine which type of family structure is 
socially most beneficial? 
In the event, the practicalities of accommodating same-sex couples within marriage 
were remarkably straight-forward, for most of the work in removing the rules that had 
traditionally ensured the legal dominance of the male spouse and legal subservience 
of the female spouse had been done long ago.  The real focus of dispute as the Bill 
was being debated was how to provide space in the public domain for those who 
cannot or will not reconcile their own consciences to the law as it now stands. 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 offers some accommodation 
to religious opponents of same-sex marriage and civil partnership, to the extent of 
ensuring that neither religious bodies nor individual members thereof are required to 
be involved in the legal creation of such relationships.  But the Act certainly does not 
exempt religious believers from having to accept, and act upon the fact, that couples 
are married: religious believers remain subject to the general law.  So it is no 
infringement of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion for the state 
to refuse to employ (or to continue to employ) as a district registrar an individual who 
does not want to be involved in registering same-sex marriages or civil partnerships.  
Bed and breakfast owners who refuse to allow same-sex couples a double room are 
still guilty of unlawful discrimination.  A local authority may still refuse to register as 
foster carers religious believers who put their own IDLWKDERYH WKH DXWKRULW\¶V QRQ-
discrimination policies.  ThRXJK WKHUH ZHUH FDOOV IRU D PXFK EURDGHU ³FRQVFLHQFH
FODXVH´ WKH 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW ZDV YHU\ wise to resist these calls, for they 
amounted to no more than a claim for general exemption for religious people from 
the legal obligation not to discriminate. 
Allowing an exemption from taking part in the (legal) creation of the relationship may 
well have been a necessary compromise in order to neutralise opposition.  However, 
the challenge for the future is not to ensure that this compromise works, but rather to 
ensure that it becomes less and less necessary.  Law- and policy-makers need to 
encourage all sections of the community to recognise the essential benignity of 
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same-sex relationships ± and indeed of unmarried relationships.  Thought it is not for 
any Parliament to tell citizens what they can and cannot believe, legislatures can 
(and should) adopt policies that allow all families, irrespective of their structure, to 
thrive; they can (and should) create a social environment in which the harmful effects 
of some religious beliefs are minimised.  Ensuring that teachers are aware of the 
insidious effects of homophobic bullying can do a lot.  Not permitting teachers or 
other leaders to endorse any second class status for those of any minority, whether 
sexual, racial or religious, can do more.  Challenging bigotry and assumptions of 
heterosexual superiority wherever they are found ± in the classroom, the football 
terraces or even the pulpit ± can help to build a society in which families are valued 
and nurtured for the functions they perform as opposed to the norms that they 
adhere to.  That is a legitimate role for the Scottish Parliament, and a clear challenge 
for them. 
 
The Parent-Child Relationship 
For most of our history the centre of gravity within the family, and the focus of family 
law, was the marital relationship between a husband and a wife: everything flowed 
from that relationship, not only the responsibilities and rights between the married 
couple themselves but also the legal connection they had with their children.  The 
VWDWXVRIWKHFKLOGZDVWUDFHGWRWKHPDUULDJHRIWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQWVDQGWKHVR-called 
³LOOHJLWLPDWH´ FKLOG VXIIHUHG VHULRXV VRFLDO DQG OHJDO GHWULPHQWV  Marriage, indeed, 
served as a mechanism both for establishing the legal relationship between children 
and their fathers and IRU FRQIHUULQJ RQ WKH IDWKHU D UROH LQ WKH FKLOG¶V upbringing.  
Marriage was the mechanism by which men were tied not only to their wives but also 
to their children. 
Today, however, the centre of gravity in family life has shifted to the parent-child 
relationship, and the predominant concern of the law needs to be to regulate that 
relationship in a way that gives all children the best chance to thrive.  Of all the 
theories of child development, the one thing that we can be most sure of is that 
children tend to thrive in an environment of stability and security.  Families today are 
clearly much more complex and fluid than in the past, with reconstituted families, 
step-parenthood, single-parenthood, kinship care of children, and same-sex 
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parenthood all becoming more common.  Given this, the major challenge for the 
future is to ensure that children are able to be brought up in stability and security 
while recognising, and accommodating, the reality that family life today takes a 
variety of different forms.  Again, therefore, regulating the function of families in 
creating the right environment for children is a much more important role for the law 
than directing the form any individual family ought to take. 
That environment depends, of course, on how parents see their role.  Too often, 
parents perceive the parent-child relationship in terms of ³rights´ reflecting the fact 
that the governing legislation, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, continues to use the 
language of parental rights.  Yet juridically speaking WKHUH DUH QR ³ULJKWV´ KHUH Ln 
disputes between parents, or between parents and others, the court does not make 
iWVGHFLVLRQE\ZHLJKLQJFRQIOLFWLQJ³ULJKWV´EXWE\LGHQWLI\LQJWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH7KLV
continued emphasis on rights has almost certainly contributed to the failure of the 
two main policy objectives of the 1995 Act: to reconceptualise the parent-child 
relationship as one of parental responsibility, and to encourage joint parenting after 
parental separation.  The social perception of the parent-child relationship, and of 
how disputes on parental separation should be resolved, remains much as it was 
before 1995.  Men, in particular, have resisted seeing parenthood as one of 
responsibility and while they have fully embraced the concept of shared parenting 
after separation they have all too often done so within the context of attempts to 
vindicate their own rights WRFRQWLQXHGLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VOLYHV.  Women, 
in particular, have been resistant to the notion of joint decision-making after parental 
separation and all too often assume that sole residence gives them the right to be 
sole decision-maker. 
The legislature in England, recognising the importance of language, has recently 
tackled this problem DQGPRYHGDZD\IURPDOHJDOSURFHVVWKDW³JUDQWV´UHVLGHQFHWR
one parent and contact to the other in favour of ³FKLOG DUUDQJHPHQW RUGHUV´5  
Additional effort is made to encourage shared parenting and the English legislation 
creates a presumption (strongly opposed, in some quarters) that continued 
LQYROYHPHQWLQDFKLOG¶VOLIHE\WKHQRQ-UHVLGHQWSDUHQWZLOOIXUWKHUWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH
Scotland would do well to watch closely how these changes to English law work in 
                                                          
5 Children and Families Act 2014. 
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practice, but the lesson from the 1995 Act is that legal change alone does not 
change parental expectation, or parental demand: what is needed is public education 
to effect a change in mindset of what being a parent is actually about ± shared 
responsibility, not individual right. 
One part of this is for the law to be far more robust in dealing with the recalcitrant 
parent who simply refuses to allow their ex-partner any role in their child¶V
upbringing.  How to enforce contact orders is an old debate that continues to be 
bedevilled by gender-politics.  Mostly the argument is between resident mothers and 
non-resident fathers and organisations such as Fathers 4 Justice, though they 
tendentiously VWUXFWXUH WKHLUDUJXPHQWV LQ WHUPVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VULJKWVWRKDYHDQG to 
know a father), exacerbate very unhelpfully a gender split emphasised by their very 
name.  Yet the law does seem virtually powerless to enforce orders that it makes 
over children if the resident parent (the main carer, usually the mother) refuses to 
obey it.  It happens (at least in Scotland) only in the most extreme and egregious of 
circumstances that a mother is imprisoned for contempt of court by defying contact 
orders.  Courts need to be more willing to use this remedy, and need to be open to 
the development of other responses that would make it far less palatable for resident 
parents to defy court orders.  Some countries revoke driving licenses, or reduce 
state benefits before the extreme of imprisonment.  In return, non-resident parents 
PXVW EH HQFRXUDJHG WR DFFHSW WKDW WKH FKLOG¶V QHHG IRU VWDELOLW\ DQG VHFXULW\ will 
sometimes require that they step back and recognise that continued disputes about 
ZKDW LV LQ WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH are, in themselves, likely to act against that very 
interest.  Being a parent requires the parent to sacrifice their own interests. 
Another part of this is for parents ± DQG ³VPDOOJRYHUQPHQW´SROLWLFLDQV ± to accept 
that the state has a supervisory role to play.  At the extreme, the state has the power 
(and duty) to impose compulsory measures of child protection when the upbringing 
process has been seriously compromised: fHZ ZRXOG FKDOOHQJH WKH VWDWH¶V UROH LQ
such circumstances.  The Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, however, 
goes much further and seeks to provide support for families at an earlier stage, when 
it is still possible to effect sufficient change within the family to render later 
FRPSXOVLRQ XQQHFHVVDU\  7KH ³QDPHG SHUVRQ´ SURYLVLons, which attracted much 




(as has happened, with tragic consequences, too often in the past).  It is misleading 
DQG XQKHOSIXO WR FDVWLJDWH WKHVH SURYLVLRQV DV WKH ³QDQQ\ VWDWH´ LPSRVLQJ ³VWDWH
JXDUGLDQV´ *XDUGLDQVDUHGHFLVLRQ-makers, while named persons are information 
facilitators with no power to overrule parental decisions.  We must never forget the 
unpalatable fact that most children who are injured by adults are injured within their 
own families: any measure designed to allow early identification of potential 
problems within families must, therefore, be a good thing, though these measures 
will work only if the resources are there to provide the necessary support. 
The provision of such resources ± which will of course be directed to some of the 
least popular sections of the community (families living with low educational 
achievement, unemployment, addiction, violence and criminality) ± lies ultimately in 
the hands of politicians.  Since every child is valuable, no matter who their parents 
are, the major challenge for Scottish family law is for politicians to see past the 
unpopularities and increase the supports available to vulnerable families as a whole.  
By these means, all children can be nurtured by the society of which they are 
members, and society as a whole will benefit. 
